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The consent decree that restructured the telecommunications industry by
breaking up the Bell System assigned long-distance and equipment
manufacturing to AT&T while forbidding the Regional Bell Operating
Companies from entering these lines of business. These restrictions were
justified by arguments that the local exchange network was a natural monopoly,
that the carriers benefited from barriers to entry, that they could leverage their
monopoly power into other markets, and that they would use revenues from
local service to subsidize their entry into other lines of business. In this Article,
Professor Spulber shows that these arguments are no longer valid because of
technological and market changes in the telecommunications industry.
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Introduction
In 1982, a consent decree known as the Modification of Final Judgment
(MFJ) terminated one of the most significant antitrust suits since Standard
Oil.' The breakup of the Bell System, which took place on January 1, 1984,
constituted a large scale vertical divestiture. The MFJ assigned the long-
distance and equipment manufacturing functions of the Bell System to AT&T.
1. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), ffd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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The local exchange services were divided among seven Regional Bell
Operating Companies (RBOCs): Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Nynex,
Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and US West.
The terms of the MFJ required the RBOCs to provide "equal access" to
the local network to all long-distance carriers and subjected the RBOCs to line-
of-business restrictions. While regulated monopolies have traditionally been
protected from rival entry, these restrictions "quarantined" the RBOCs within
their markets by barring their entry elsewhere. The restrictions forbade the
RBOCs from providing long-distance services from one local access and
transport area (LATA) to another and from manufacturing telecommunications
equipment.2 A third line-of-business restriction concerning the provision of
information services has been effectively removed since the divestiture.'
The Bell System breakup led to increased regulation and litigation. The
MFJ established what has become a complex regulatory apparatus that both
implements the terms of the consent decree and reviews the RBOCs' attempts
to enter markets. Although the RBOCs were "quarantined," the MFJ calls for
a triennial review, in which the RBOCs are allowed to petition the court for
permission to expand into other markets. For the past decade, the RBOCs,
AT&T, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have been mired in virtually
continuous litigation to interpret the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions. This
has effectively placed the Federal District Court of the District of Columbia
and the DOJ in the regulation business. In addition, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has been drawn further into increased
involvement with the industry in promoting competition, particularly through
administration of open access.4 Moreover, state regulation of the RBOCs
continues to exist.
This Article examines whether it would serve economic efficiency and
consumer well-being to remove the two remaining line-of-business restrictions
imposed on the RBOCs. This question is important for several reasons.
2. The local exchange network is the portion of the public switched network served by the local
exchange carriers which include the seven RBOCs as well as hundreds of independent telephone compa-
nies. The designated areas served by the RBOCs are referred to as LATAs. The RBOCs provide both
exchange services, such as basic dial tone service, call waiting, call forwarding, and Centrex, as well
as exchange access services, such as connection to long-distance carriers. The interLATA or
interexchange network is the portion of the public switched network that is served by the long-distance
carriers. See NORTH AM. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASS'N, INDUSTRY BASICS 19-22 (4th ed. 1991).
3. For thorough discussions of the divestiture and its aftermath, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL,
AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MOPE COMPETITIVE ERA (1991); MICHAEL
K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (1992); PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE
BELL SYSTEM (1987); Paul W. MacAvoy and Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T
Settlement and its Impact on Telecommunications, I YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983); Paul W. MacAvoy and
Kenneth Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE
J. ON REG. 225 (1985).
4. See DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 16 (1989).
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Telecommunications is a substantial sector of the American economy.'
Moreover, given the convergence of computers and telecommunications,
continued technical progress is a vital part of the information economy.6
Furthermore, the lessons from the telecommunications industry are applicable
to other network industries such as electric power, natural gas, cable
television, water services, and postal delivery, each of which is experiencing
technological change that is breaking down monopolies and destabilizing the
established regulatory regimes.
Taking into consideration the current and past conditions of the
telecommunications industry, this Article evaluates the four principal economic
arguments for keeping the line-of-business restrictions on the RBOCs. These
arguments, often directed at local exchange carriers (LECs) generally, can be
summarized as follows:'
1. The LECs' production technology in the local ex-
change exhibits the property of natural monopoly.
2. The LECs are the beneficiaries of significant barriers
to entry into the local exchange.
3. The LECs can leverage the local-exchange monopoly
into other markets.
4. The LECs can employ cross-subsidization from local
service to gain competitive advantages upon entry into
other lines of business.
These arguments for preserving the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions are
irreconcilable with economic and technological developments in the industry
since the MFJ. Continuing the restrictions could only be based on an improper
economic analysis of industry conditions. Vacating the MFJ's restrictions
would enhance efficiency in the industry and serve the public interest.
5. In 1992, United States telecommunications service and equipment revenue was $221.4 billion;
the estimated revenue for 1993 was $238.8 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL
OUTLOOK 1994, 29-1 (1994) (1992 domestic and international service revenue $169.2 billion; 1993
estimate $179.4 billion); NORTH AM. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASS'N, 1993-1994 TELECOMM. MARKET
REVIEW & FORECAST ch. V (1993) (1992 equipment market $52.4 billion; 1993 projection $59.5 billion).
The equipment market includes data and networking, emerging technology, mobile communications,
facsimile, call/voice processing, teleconferencing, consumer, private branch exchange, computer
telephone integration, key/hybrid, public pay phone and network equipment.
6. See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
THE NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION
(1991).
7. The term local exchange carriers refers to companies providing local telephone service and
includes the RBOCs as well as other companies subject to state regulation.
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The first two arguments are related to the characteristics of the local
exchange market. The AT&T divestiture and the line-of-business restrictions
in the MFJ were predicated on the concern that local exchange telephony was
a natural monopoly technology which AT&T had allegedly used to harm
competition in other markets. In particular, AT&T was alleged to have
provided its rivals in the long-distance market inferior or costlier connections
to the local exchange than AT&T provided to its own Long Lines division, a
practice sometimes referred to as "discriminatory access." The MFJ reflected
Judge Harold H. Greene's concern that the RBOCs would retain a monopoly
over the local exchange as a consequence of their natural monopoly technology
and barriers to entry. If allowed to enter into long-distance service and
equipment manufacturing, the RBOCs allegedly would have the means to deny
access to competing suppliers, just as AT&T had been accused of doing prior
to the MFJ.
The final two arguments attempt to predict the behavior of the LECs in
the markets for long-distance and equipment manufacturing. AT&T allegedly
harmed rivals by deceiving its rate-of-return regulators through misallocation
of costs from inter-exchange and other operations to the local operating compa-
nies. This cross-subsidization allegedly enabled AT&T to evade rate-of-return
regulation and to engage in predatory pricing against efficient competitors in
markets adjacent to the local exchange. The divestiture and quarantine
provisions of the MFJ reflected Judge Greene's concern that the RBOCs, like
AT&T, would use their monopoly position in the local exchange markets to
obtain a competitive advantage in the long-distance and equipment manufactur-
ing markets.
The four arguments outlined above were advanced by Judge Greene as
justifications for accepting the MFJ. They reflect traditional regulatory
arguments that are generally not applicable to the existing telecommunications
industry. The arguments were presented in testimony in the AT&T case. The
Department of Justice contended that the "natural monopoly characteristics"
of the local exchange precluded competition "until a point of concentration of
interexchange traffic above the end office. "' The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, which approved the MFJ, explained that the motivation for
bringing the antitrust case against AT&T and, later, the justification for the
consent decree, "was that AT&T had used its natural monopoly over local
exchange services to impede competition in related markets."' As Judge
Greene observed with regard to barriers to entry, "[t]he evidence introduced
at the trial of this case clearly demonstrated that duplication of the ubiquitous
8. Response of the United States to Comments Received on the BOC (Bell Operating
Company) LATA Proposals at 9-10; United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C.
1987) (No. 82-192), affid, 894 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
9. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 1387, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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local exchange networks would require an enormous and prohibitive capital
investment, and no one seriously questions that this is true."' 0 Elsewhere;
he stated: "The government alleges that defendants have monopoly power in
each of these markets and, to prove the existence of such power, evidence has
been offered of market share, barriers to entry, size, and the exercise of
power. "11
The ability of the RBOCs to leverage their power was viewed as
temporary: "It is probable that, over time, the Operating Companies will lose
the ability to leverage their monopoly power into the competitive markets from
which they must now be barred."12 The Justice Department stated that "[tihe
reorganization of AT&T . . . is intended to eliminate the present incentives
of the BOCs ... to discriminate against AT&T's competitors in the markets
for interexchange services, information services, customer premises equipment,
and the procurement of equipment used to provide local exchange services." 3
With regard to cross-subsidization, Judge Greene stated that "the proposed
decree would complement the structural changes by various restrictions which
are said to be designed (1) to prevent the divested Operating Companies from
discriminating against AT&T's competitors, and (2) to avoid a recurrence of
the type of discrimination and cross-subsidization that were the basis of the
AT&T lawsuit." 4
Parts I through IV of this Article demonstrate that: (1) the RBOCs'
technology in the local exchange no longer exhibits cost properties associated
with natural monopoly; (2) the RBOCs are not currently the beneficiaries of
any significant entry barriers; (3) the RBOCs would not be able to unfairly
leverage their market positions in the local exchange into other markets; and
(4) the RBOCs would be unable to employ cross-subsidies from local service
to achieve competitive advantages in other lines of business.
The Article concludes in Part V that the elimination of the MFJ's
restrictions would enhance economic efficiency-productive, allocative, and
dynamic-in the telecommunications sector. Therefore, given the central
importance of telecommunications in the United States economy, elimination
of the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions would significantly further the public
interest.
10. 673 F. Supp. at 538.
11. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1346 (D.D.C. 1981).
12. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), off'd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
13. Competitive Impact Statement in Connection with Proposed Modification of Final Judgment,
47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7175 (1982) (footnote omitted). The Decree's injunctive provisions "limit the
functions of the divested BOCs to preclude the possibility of a recurrence of the type of monopolizing
conduct that the United States alleges to have resulted from AT&T's ownership of regulated local
exchange carriers and its simultaneous participation in competitive, or potentially competitive, markets."
Id.
14. 552 F. Supp. at 142.
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The implications of this Article extend beyond the telecommunications
industry. Traditional justifications for regulating industries, such as the
presence of natural monopoly technologies, may no longer apply in the
presence of technological change and competitive entry. As this Article asserts
in the context of the telecommunications field, technological change strikes at
the heart of the natural monopoly argument. Moreover, technological progress
that reduces dependence on irreversible capital investment significantly reduces
the need for concern over barriers to entry.
I. The Natural Monopoly Argument
The first argument used to justify the MFJ's line of business restrictions
is that the RBOCs have a monopoly over the local exchange because their
technology has the property of natural monopoly. This Section defines natural
monopoly and examines the application of the natural monopoly argument to
the local exchange. The Section shows that the local exchange has lost or is
quickly losing the characteristics of a natural monopoly and that natural
monopoly is not a barrier to entry.
A. The Definition of Natural Monopoly
A given production technology is said to exhibit the property of natural
monopoly if a single firm can supply the market at lower cost than can two
or more firms. 5 A sufficient condition for the cost function to have the
natural monopoly property is for the technology to exhibit economies of scale,
which are present if the marginal costs of production are less than the average
costs of production over the relevant range of output. 16 Economies of scale
can be due to many different technological factors. Fixed costs are a source
of economies of scale that is particularly significant in telecommunications and
all other industries that require networks, such as railroads, oil, and natural
gas pipelines, electricity, and water services. Fixed costs are costs that do not
vary with fluctuations in output, unlike variable costs. The fixed costs of
establishing a network system are the costs of facilities such as transmission
15. The concept of natural monopoly is generally credited to John Stuart Mill. 1 JOHN S. MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 132-54 (W.J. Ashley, ed., Augustus M. Kelly 1961) (1848). Mill
emphasizes the problem of wasteful duplication of transmission facilities that can occur in utility services.
The connection between natural monopoly and regulation is developed by Leon Walras with reference
to the construction and operation of railroads. See LEON WALRAS, fITUDES D'tCONOMIE SOCIALE:
THIORIE DE LA RIPARTITION DE LA RICHE5SE SOCIALE (1936).
16. The firm's average cost function refers to the cost per unit of output evaluated at each level
of output. The firm's marginal cost function refers to the additional cost of producing one more unit
of output, evaluated at each level of output. Economies of scale are not necessary for natural monopoly.
The natural monopoly property can be present at an output level at which the cost function exhibits
decreasing returns to scale. See SPULBER, supra note 4, at 117.
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lines, costs which are not sensitive to the level of transmission on the lines.
In other words, where there are significant fixed costs such as those of
transmission networks, the technology for the industry will exhibit economies
of scale and thus be labelled a natural monopoly.
The need to avoid duplication of facilities, particularly duplication of the
fixed costs of the network system, is an important component of the natural
monopoly argument for regulation of the local exchange. 7 The contention
is that since costs are minimized by not duplicating transmission facilities,
regulators should bar the entry of competing carriers. This argument has been
put forward in a wide range of regulated industries in which transmission or
transportation facilities are a significant portion of total costs.
The standard definition of natural monopoly is based on a cost function
that assigns total costs to outputs. The cost function has the natural monopoly
property if a firm has lower costs than would two or more firms using the
same cost function.18 If the technology of local exchange telecommunications
is in fact a natural monopoly, then a single firm can construct and operate that
network at a lower cost than can two or more firms. Thus, the existence of
a natural monopoly in the local exchange is a justification for both state and
federal regulation of the industry. According to this argument, regulation of
entry is necessary to achieve static efficiency by establishing the least-cost
industry structure, namely a single firm. And while the focus of this Article
is the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions, it should be emphasized that if the
local exchange is not a natural monopoly, a substantial reevaluation of state
regulation of the local exchange would also be appropriate.
A number of important aspects of the definition of natural monopoly
should be highlighted, since understanding their implications is necessary to
correctly apply the definition to the telecommunications industry. A natural
monopoly begins with a known technology. To assert that an industry is
characterized by natural monopoly assumes that there is a single best
technology that is commonly known, that all firms would have access to that
technology, and that all firms utilizing that technology would be at the efficient
production-possibility frontier. 9 In particular, the natural monopoly cost
function is a long run cost function, so that investment can be adjusted to
achieve the efficient level of capital investment required for operating at mini-
mum cost for any output level.
17. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 537 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 894
F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
18. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 17 (rev. ed. 1988). In this text, the definition of a natural monopoly refers to
an industry in which all of the firms have the same cost function.
19. See SPULBER, supra note 4, at 16.
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B. Natural Monopoly and the Local Exchange
Prior to the breakup of the Bell System, the local exchange was widely
viewed as a natural monopoly. Under Theodore Vail, who advanced the well
known slogan "One policy, one system, and universal service," AT&T itself
maintained that telephone service was a natural monopoly.2' The Communi-
cations Act of 1934, which instituted federal regulation of telephone service,
reflected this view.2 According to Alfred E. Kahn: "That the provision of
local telephone service is a natural monopoly is generally conceded."22 Then
Professor, now Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that "local
telephone service seems to be generally accepted as a natural monopoly."'3
The belief that the local exchange service constituted a natural monopoly
undoubtedly influenced the implementation of the MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions.
The natural monopoly argument for continuation of the line-of-business
restrictions asserts that the LECs, and hence the RBOCs, have a monopoly
over the local exchange because the technology of the exchange exhibits the
characteristics of a natural monopoly. In 1987, Judge Greene stated: "The
exchange monopoly of the Regional Companies has continued because it is a
natural monopoly."24 From the natural monopoly argument for regulation
flows the assertion that not only would one LEC serve a given market most
efficiently, but also that if competition were allowed, only one carrier would
survive. Thus, based on this view, regulation of the local exchange is efficient
and justified.
The natural monopoly argument for regulation supports restricting entry
into the local telecommunications loop and awarding a monopoly franchise.
In turn, awarding a monopoly franchise provides justification not only for
regulating the single firm's prices and other activities, but also for preventing
the firm from engaging in other economic activities. If the natural monopoly
argument for regulation is no longer valid, however, this would suggest that
20. ROBERT B. HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 99 (1989).
21. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 291 (1982).
22. 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTrrUTIONS 127
(1971). However, Kahn observes the substantial technological change in communications after World
War H, including microwave relay systems, satellites, transoceanic cable, and cable television, and
comments that "[i]n the presence of such rapid change, the natural monopoly of yesterday may be trans-
formed into a natural area of competition today; and vice versa." Id. at 127.
23. See BREYER, supra note 21, at 291. Breyer observes that while technological change may
make competition possible in the future, such developments are "speculative." Id. at 292.
24. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 537 (D.D.C. 1987), affid, 894 F.2d
1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990). "Exchange telecommunications," Judge Greene continued, "is characterized
by very substantial economies of scale and scope." Id. at 538 (citing AT&T Proposed Settlement, Pan
I" Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Ses. 59 (1981)
(testimony of William Baxter, Asst. Attorney General)).
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restriction of entry into the local telecommunications loop is not justified.
Moreover, if invalid, the natural monopoly argument cannot be used by
extension to prevent the local telecommunications provider from entering into
other economic activities.
Regarding the developments in the telecommunications industry since the
AT&T divestiture, substantial technological change and industry transformation
have rendered the natural monopoly argument invalid. There are a number of
reasons why it is no longer correct to treat the local exchange as a natural
monopoly.25 First, there is no existing single best technology for
telecommunications transmission. Second, the best potential technology or
mixture of technologies is not yet known, as there continues to be substantial
technological change in the industry. Third, the connectivity of networks
eliminates the natural monopoly, because multiple carriers can provide
interconnecting networks. Fourth, the goal of avoiding duplicative facilities
is not applicable as an aspect of natural monopoly in local telecommunications,
because substantial duplication of facilities has already occurred.
Even if the technology of transmission were to exhibit natural monopoly
properties, the technology does not necessarily constitute a barrier to entry.
New entrants can compete with the incumbent to serve the market. Moreover,
even if the technology were to have natural monopoly properties, it does not
necessarily follow that the incumbent utilizes the technology so efficiently as
to render the market invulnerable to more efficient entrants. If, as this Article
asserts, the technology of the local exchange is no longer a natural monopoly,
entry into the local loop will continue, and the MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions should be eliminated.
C. The Local Exchange Has Lost or Is Quickly Losing the Characteristics of
a Natural Monopoly
1. There Is No Single Best Technology for Local Telecommunications
The natural monopoly argument asserts that cost efficiencies are obtained
from a single supplier, given the characteristics of a specific technology for
carrying out a specific task. With multiple technologies, each with different
characteristics, efficiency may require production by multiple firms, so that
monopoly no longer yields cost efficiencies. Perhaps the notion of a best
technology once served as an accurate description of the traditional
telecommunications system, which consisted of copper wires for transmission,
central switching equipment, and very basic equipment on the customer's
25. Whether the local exchange ever exhibited the properties of natural monopoly is beyond
the scope of this article.
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premises. This description no longer applies,26 as a consequence of
technological change and industry developments, particularly since the MFJ
took effect. In short, there is no longer a single best technology for
telecommunications transmission.
Instead, there are now multiple telecommunications technologies in
addition to the traditional copper wire. The alternative modes of transmission
include coaxial cable, fiber-optic cable, satellite, microwave, cellular, and
other radio technologies. Each of these technologies has various advantages
and disadvantages in terms of cost and performance. It is no longer possible,
nor is it desirable, to pick a single mode of transmission to the exclusion of
all others.27 The variety of competing transmission technologies implies that
it is no longer possible to define a natural monopoly technology for local
telephony.
It may be asserted that a combination of transmission modes is best, and
that this unknown combination should be chosen efficiently by a single
supplier. Such an attempt to revive the natural monopoly argument, however,
would be plagued with difficulties, since the correct mix of technologies could
be provided by multiple suppliers. Moreover, since the relative cost and
performance characteristics of the alternative technologies change continuously,
the optimal mix of technologies will frequently change.
Not only is there no single best technology for traditional telephone
service, there is no single best technology for handling the many new types
of services the telecommunications industry now provides. The traditional
telecommunications system was designed to handle voice transmission from
stationary equipment. Today, however, consumers demand many alternative
communications products, including fax, data transmission, interactive
services, video transmission, and both mobile and stationary communications.
George Calhoun forecasts that future telecommunications technology will not
be confined to a single form but will include many forms of access,
some on a small scale (e.g. microcell radio), some of global
proportions (VSAT), some optimized for narrowband transmissions,
others for broadband, some for vehicular communications, others for
26. See generally NORTH AM. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASS'N, supra note 5, ch. V.
27. George Calhoun asserts that "the abandonment of hierarchical structures is gathering
momentum, especially in the core public network and in specialized computer networks." GEORGE
CALHOUN, WIRELEss AccEss AND THE LOCAL TELEPHONE NETWORK 532 (1992). He describes the
"laminar network," "a series of partly competing, partly complementary, somewhat differentiated,
overlapping access fabrics" that "will consist of multiple layers of transmission facilities for accessing
the core network at an increasing number of gateways. The lowest levels will still be copper-based
fabrics, the vast installed base of wireline telephony and coaxial cable television plant that will continue
in use for decades. Growing over these there will be several new layers of fiber optic plant-and, because
of its nature, ever more layers of digital radio. Even within a given fabric layer there will almost
certainly be a great deal of technical diversity." id. at 537, 539.
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fixed or portable, some for data-dominant traffic, others for voice-
dominant traffic, and still others for the transmission of image-based
traffic-all rather imperfectly stitched together.28
The transmission technologies vary in terms of their suitability and
performance in carrying out these diverse transmission tasks. Moreover,
telecommunications companies provide a wide array of additional switching
services with different sets of switching and computer technologies. These
switching and computer technologies also vary in terms of their cost and
performance in the supply of various services. Also, there are different
technological requirements for different portions of the telecommunications
system. The technological requirements for transmission and for switching
long-distance telecommunications differ considerably from those required for
access to the telecommunications network. There are now multiple
technological approaches for access to, as well as transmission of, local
telephone service. As George Calhoun observes with respect to the large set
of choices available simply for providing access:
So the real question faced by planners is not "Which is cheaper,
radio or wire?" but "What is the most cost-effective mix of radio,
cable, and fiber in the access network for a given situation?" The
complexity of this question can overwhelm even a fully computerized
modeling process. In principle, there are dozens, or hundreds, of
solutions (in the mathematical sense of the word) for a given
exchange. And when we realize that radio easily transcends the
traditional exchange concept . . . . the solution set multiplies
further.29
The natural monopoly argument becomes even less applicable when it is
recognized that a telecommunications company can offer an array of telephone
services, including basic voice transmission. The definition of natural
monopoly, of course, may be extended to cover multiproduct technology. In
the multiproduct case, the technology is said to have the natural monopoly
property if a single firm can provide the bundle of products at a lower cost
than can two or more firms. Under such conditions, the single firm enjoys
economies of scope.3" If distinct technologies are suitable for providing
different products and services, such as voice, data transmission, interactive
information services, and mobile communication, the argument that a single
provider is optimal ceases to hold. Support for the natural monopoly argument
28. Id. at 527.
29. Id. at 470.
30. See, e.g., SPtLBER, supra note 4, at 114-17.
Vol. 12:25, 1995
Deregulating Telecommunications
would require satisfying a difficult, if not impossible, burden of proving that
a single provider of many diverse technologies would be cost-efficient. The
burden of proof becomes even more difficult when the technologies are applied
to an ever widening array of different services.
In addition to the many telecommunications technologies handling many
different functions, technology within any particular category can differ
substantially across firms as a consequence of technological change. Firms
have different production technologies because technological knowledge
diffuses unevenly, and because technologies are embodied differently across
different types of facilities and different generations of capital equipment.3
With changing technology, therefore, costs can differ substantially across
firms, and one cannot conclude a priori that a single firm can produce at lower
costs than can two or more firms.
The natural monopoly argument that all technologies are known and that
all firms have access to the best technology is no longer applicable as a
description of local-exchange telecommunications. There has been substantial
technological change in computers, computer based switching equipment,
digital transmission methods, wireless access, fiber optics, and other key
technologies since the MFJ was implemented. Thus, it is no longer possible
to identify a stable best technology that can serve as the basis for the natural
monopoly argument. Without such a basis, the natural monopoly argument
cannot be used to establish the cost-efficiency of a single protected provider
of service. For example, although fiber optics may have a clear advantage for
some forms of trunkline transmission, there are a number of alternatives for
handling connections to the network that continue to be developed.
Many crucial issues remain open, including the configuration of the access
network and the standards for digital transmission in access. George Calhoun
observes:
[T]he proper architecture for a digital access network is still very
much in question. Star, ring or bus? Fiber to the home? Fiber to the
curb? Radio tails? "Alternative access?" ISDN, or what? Moreover,
regardless of which physical configuration prevails, the efficient
digitalization of the access environment will require equipment based
31. For example, Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) technology will enable providers of cellular service to offer what the customer wants: quality
and the ability to call anyone, anytime. See CELLU.AI TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUS. ASS'N, STATE
OF THE CELLULAR INDUSTRY 101 (1992). Different carriers utilize different technologies. "Among the
top nine operators, six have said they favor CDMA. But ... three operators [are] currently moving
forward with TDMA.. . ." Karen 0. Nielsen, The Growing Pains of Cellular Services, TELEcoM
MARKET LETTER, Oct. 4, 1993, at 58.
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on standards that are still under development or, at best, just
beginning to be commercialized.32
If the best technology is not known, it cannot be asserted that an RBOC
will necessarily have access to the best technology or that entry of new
suppliers using alternative technologies cannot occur.
2. The Connectivity of Networks Renders Natural Monopoly Obsolete
The natural monopoly argument is also weakened by the connectivity of
networks. Improvements in computers and related switching technology allow
different firms to build and operate multiple networks that can then be
interconnected.33 The costs of interconnection have fallen substantially as the
costs of switching technology have decreased. Open network architecture
further reduces the benefits of a centrally switched network. In addition, new
developments in switching have allowed customer premises equipment, such
as the private branch exchange (PBX) and local area networks, to be
substituted for transmission and switching by the telecommunications utility.'
These significant developments render the concept of a natural monopoly
telecommunications network obsolete.
3. The Problem of Duplicative Facilities No Longer Applies
At the heart of the natural monopoly argument lies the need to avoid
duplication of facilities, particularly costly transmission facilities such as
32. CALHOUN, supra note 27, at 534.
33. As former FCC chairman Alfred Sikes testified before Congress, "I do not believe that
affording telephone companies expanded opportunities will result in a single network. Rather, I believe
there will be satellite, mobile, broadcast, as well as cable and other distribution technologies. They will
provide both independent and competitive transmission paths, and will often be linked together in a
network of networks." Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991:
Hearings on S. 1200 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1992) (statement of Alfred C. Sikes). Mike Nelson,
Special Assistant for Information Technology in the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, sees phone and cable companies as "primary players" in developing what he calls the "network
of networks," but notes that opportunities to participate will also present themselves to other
communications and information technology vendors. NlBoardto Include Members of Satellite Industry;
Advisory Committee on the National Information Infrastructure, DEF. DAILY, Dec. 10, 1993, at 47. Tom
Kalil, Director of Science and Technology for the National Economic Council, notes that "(pleople
assume we are automatically talking about wires, but they don't realize that we're also talking about
wireless and broadcast satellites.., that's why the phrase 'a network of networks' is so important. No
one has in mind a monolithic, centrally designed platform for disseminating all the information." Kim
McAvoy & Sean Scully, Interagency Task Force Expected To Release Report Before End of Summer;
National Information Infrastructure, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 5, 1993, at 26.
34. Note that Shared Tenant Services (STS) are the residential equivalent of the business PBX.
STS "[plrovid[es] centralized telecommunications services to tenants in a building or a complex." HARRY
NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 935 (1994).
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telecommunications lines. The advantage of having only one, as opposed to
two or more producers, is that the single producer will create a single network,
while two or more producers will create two or more networks, duplicating
facilities and thus experiencing higher total costs. This crucial part of the
natural monopoly argument has been rendered invalid.
Most importantly, the avoidance of duplication of networks is no longer
an issue because duplication has already occurred. In many areas there are
multiple networks employing fiber optic, cellular, and microwave techniques,
and these networks essentially duplicate some transmission capabilities. "A
technologically vibrant industry does not advance by 'duplication.' New
technologies (integrated circuits, lasers), new media (radio instead of copper
wire, fiber instead of microwave), new architectures (rings instead of stars),
replace old ones."" The convergence of applications of alternative technolo
gies suggests that the duplication problem no longer exists.
For example, a high proportion of households has both standard telephone
service and cable telecommunications services. a6 In August 1993, it was
estimated that over ninety-one million homes have cable service available. 7
The coaxial cable that delivers cable television is already capable of delivering
telephone and other telecommunications services as well.38 Cable companies,
now allied with out-of-region telephone companies, are reportedly planning
to spend fourteen billion dollars deploying fiber over the next decade. 9
According to former National Cable Television Association President James
Mooney, "[t]he biggest telecommunications story of the decade may turn out
to be not telcos' creating broadband networks, but cable technology and
architecture proving to be the most efficient means of delivering the next
35. PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE GEODESIC NETWORK 1i, 1993 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 2.80 (1992). The authors further observe: "Nor does competition arrive in
a single leap. Instead it enters one market segment at a time, switch by switch, trunk by trunk, line by
line, beginning where prices are highest and costs lowest." Id.
36. Cable operators are permitted to offer some types of telephone services. See In re Application
of Teleport Communications-N. Y., 7 F.C.C.R. 5986, 5988 (1992) (permitting cable company to offer
competitive access services in competition with New York Telephone); In re Telephone Company-Cable
Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C.R. 300, 322-23 (1991) (allowing cross-ownership between
cable companies and interexchange telephone carriers); In re Twixtel Technologies, Inc., 5 F.C.C.R.
4547 (1990); Report & Order in Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,644 & n.34 (1985) (cable companies may offer cellular radio
services); ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding FCC determination that cable
companies may offer cellular radio services) cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
37. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASS'N, CABLE TELEVISION DEVELOPMENTS (1994) (quoting
estimate from PAUL KAGAN AssocS., INC., MARKETING NEW MEDIA, Dec. 20, 1993, at 4).
38. See SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, CoACCESS: CATV TELEPHONE SYSTEM: A DUAL-SERVICE
TELEPHONY/VIDEO SYSTEM FOR CATV NETWORKS (1993). About three quarters of national cable
installations were capable of two-way communications by the end of 1992. See NORTH AM.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASS'N, supra note 5, at 134. According to the North American
Telecommunications Association, "[The cable industry ... already has in place most of the plant and
infrastructure to compete head-on with local telcos." Id.
39. NORTH AM. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASS'N, supra note 5, at 134.
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generation of communications services."' Alliances between telephone and
cable companies are extending these capabilities. 4'
Moreover, in most cities a number of alternative ways to access the
network exist in addition to the LEC's local loop. These alternatives include
two cellular carriers and fiber-optic connections supplied by competitive access
providers (CAPs). There is rapid growth in cellular communications.42
Furthermore, forecasts suggest that personal communications services (PCS)
will have over eighty million subscribers by 1997 and 145 million five years
later.43 Therefore, the view that technology confers an inherent advantage on
an incumbent RBOC, thus giving it a natural monopoly, is controverted by the
fact that multiple local networks are already in operation.
The desire to avoid duplication of costly transmission facilities is also
inconsistent with the technological changes involving wireless technologies.
Even if wire-based transmission technologies exhibit the natural monopoly
property, segments of the local loop are being replaced with wireless technol-
40. Politics Also Mentioned, Comm. DAILY, May 5, 1992, at 4. At a recent National Cable
Television Association convention, cable industry representatives declared their intention "to take on
the telephone industry . . . ." Id.
41. For example, two RBOCs are already poised to offer out-of-region local phone service over
cable television lines. Time Warner/US West will provide full-featured local phone service over its cable
television network in Rochester, New York by the beginning of 1996, in direct competition with
Rochester Telephone. See Eric Paulak, Stay Tuned for Less Expensive Phone Rates, NErwoRK WORLD,
Aug. 22, 1994, at 30. Pending state regulatory approval, SBC Media Ventures (a subsidiary of SBC
Communications, formerly Southwestern Bell) will offer phone service over its cable television network
in 1995, in Montgomery County, Maryland in direct competition with Bell Atlantic. Southwestern Bell
Seeks Md. PSC Approval for Cable Telephone, COMMON CARRIER WK., May 30, 1994, available in
Westlaw, Magsplus Library, 1994 WL 2312223; States Meander Toward Rules to Foster CAP
Competition, TELco Bus. REP., July 5, 1994 [hereinafter States Meander]. Southwestern Bell purchased
100% of Hauser Cable. Paul Farhi, Southwestern Bell to Buy Arlington, Montgomery Cable, WASH.
POsT, Feb. 10, 1993, at C1. U S West paid $2.5 billion for a 25% stake in Time Warner. Johnnie
Roberts & Laura Landro, US West and Time Warner to Form Strategic Alliance; Baby Bell to Pay $2.5
Billion for Stake and a Partner in Technology Footrace, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1993, at A3. BellSouth
acquired 22.5% of Prime Management, which operates Prime Cable. John Greenwald, Wired! Bell
Atlantic's Bid for Cable Giant TCI is the Biggest Media Deal in History; It's Also a Peek at the Future,
TIME, Oct. 25, 1993, at 50. NYNEX invested $1.2 billion in Viacom. Johnnie Roberts, Vacom to Get
$1.2 Billion from Nynex, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1993, at A3. Bell Canada paid $400 million for 30%
of Jones Intercable with an option to gain a controlling interest within the next eight years. Christopher
Chipello, Corporate Focus: BCE Faces Promises and Perils of Telecommunications; Wth Jones Deal,
Company Bets on Interlocking Cable, Phones, Multimedia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1993, at B4; Edmund
Andrews, Company News; BCE to Buy 30% of Jones Intercable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at 1, 39.
MCI has recently announced a joint experiment with Jones Intercable to test phone service over the Jones
cable network in Alexandria, Virginia. MCI, Jones Phone Home, VARIErY, Dec. 6, 1993, at 20. MCI
and Jones Intercable, along with Bell Canada, are conducting a trial of voice services in Chicago.
Telephone Services to Be Tested over Cable TV Systens, TELECOMM. REp., Nov. 29, 1993, at 10-11.
42. The market for cellular communications grew from thirteen million subscribers as of mid-
1993, according to a Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association press release from October 1993,
to over nineteen million subscribers as of mid-1994. Over 17,000 new customers are reported to
subscribe each day. Cellular Phone Subscribers Top 19Million Mark, REUTER Bus. REP., Sept. 5, 1994,
available in LEIUS, News Library, Wires File.
43. Multiservice PCS Use is Expected to Be Key Element Driving Demand for New Mobile
Services, According to Survey by Telocator, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 1, 1993, at 5.
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ogies, many of which may not exhibit natural monopoly characteristics.
Competitive entry can and indeed has occurred. Competing firms are serving
the telecommunications market with wireless technologies such as cellular,
microwave, and satellite systems. Additional competitive entry in the form of
personal communications services will follow.
Moreover, the substitution of low cost switching technology for
transmission further reduces the need for concern over the duplication of
transmission facilities. Substantial portions of the network can be replaced by
equipment on customer premises, including customer-owned switching, such
as private branch exchanges, and customer-owned transmission facilities. The
amount of duplication required by competing networks is substantially reduced,
thus lowering the cost advantage of a single producer over two or more
producers.
D. Natural Monopoly Technology Is Not a Barrier to Entry
By itself, a natural monopoly technology does not act as a barrier to
entry." Firms can enter an industry and compete with incumbents even if
production by a single firm is efficient. Natural monopoly technology does not
prevent the entrant from investing in new facilities, announcing prices,
recruiting customers, and otherwise competing with the incumbent. To
effectively deter entry, the incumbent firm must be able to set prices and retain
its customers such that entry is no longer profitable. It is important to
emphasize that, even if a single firm could serve the market more efficiently
than could two or more firms, this state of affairs does not imply that entering
firms cannot compete to serve the market. Furthermore, natural monopoly
technology does not rule out the possibility of multiple competitors entering
to serve the market simultaneously.
1. Natural Monopoly Does Not Preclude Competition to Serve the
Market
By itself, natural monopoly technology does not prevent firms from
competing to serve a particular market. Along with other economic analyses
of entry and competition, the economic literature on contestable markets has
shown that competition for the market can occur with natural monopoly
technology, and it has stated the conditions under which there may or may not
be prices such that an incumbent can sustain a monopoly position."' Under
44. Whether or not the local exchange exhibits barriers to entry regardless of natural monopoly
is the subject of Part II.
45. See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 18, at 7. The authors refer to an industry in which there
are negligible barriers to entry as "contestable" and point out that companies that are natural monopolies
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certain demand and cost conditions, an incumbent can sustain its position
against new entry, but only by choosing prices that yield zero profits.
Even under the very specific demand and cost conditions sufficient for
"sustainable" monopoly prices, the possibility of sustainable prices need not
prevent entrants from successfully competing for the market if the incumbent
were to deviate from those prices. Even if these conditions were to hold,
therefore, an incumbent firm could not leverage its monopoly position to favor
other lines of business, because this action would create opportunities for new
entrants to serve customers by not requiring the purchase of additional
services. In addition, the monopolist could not generate profits to subsidize
entry into other lines of business, because the potential for entry into a
contestable market eliminates both profits and cross-subsidies.
For purposes of argument, however, suppose that the production technolo-
gy of the local exchange were to exhibit the property of natural monopoly,
contrary to the hypothesis of this Article. This does not imply that the LEC
could select prices that would deter entry. The existence of multiple technolo-
gies, the ongoing development of new technologies, and the differences in
information that firms have about the technology create opportunities for the
entry of competitors. Therefore, an incumbent could not sustain a monopoly
position simply through the selection of prices. Given the technological change
that has been occurring in the telecommunications industry since the MFJ, the
incumbent cannot be expected to sustain a monopoly position. The entry of
new carriers providing alternative access and transmission services that are
economic substitutes for the services of the RBOCs clearly demonstrates that
a monopoly over the local loop is not sustainable.
2. The Natural Monopoly Argument Does Not Apply with Cost
Inefficiencies
A firm cannot enjoy the cost advantages of natural monopoly unless the
firm utilizes its production technology at the efficient frontier. This means that,
given a particular productive technology, the monopoly provider purchases and
employs productive inputs efficiently to minimize costs. If this is not the case,
then a firm operating in the market is subject to competition from more
efficient entrants. Thus, the natural monopoly properties of the technology are
not sufficient by any means to guarantee that an incumbent can secure a
monopoly position. If the incumbent firm is not operating efficiently, a more
efficient entrant can provide equal or better service to customers at a lower
price.
can compete to serve the market.
Vol. 12:25, 1995
Deregulating Telecommunications
A number of reasons, including the presence of regulation, suggest that
incumbents in telecommunications are not utilizing their technology in the most
economically efficient manner. If investment incentives are distorted, the
technology will not be operated at the efficient frontier. A number of factors
indicate that the investment level of the local telecommunications providers
should not be presumed to be at an efficient level. Price regulations, the entry
of competing carriers, the line-of-business restrictions, and regulatory
uncertainty will affect the incentives of a local telecommunications company
to invest. To the extent that investment departs from efficient levels, the notion
that natural monopoly technology prevents entry ceases to apply.
3. The Existence of Multiple Carriers Calls into Question the Natural
Monopoly Argument
The argument that the technology of the local exchange exhibits natural
monopoly properties, and thereby confers a monopoly on the local exchange,
is refuted if competitive entry successfully occurs. The presence of competitors
in the local exchange leads to one of two conclusions. First, if natural
monopoly technology is sufficient to create a monopoly, then the entry of
competitors must imply either that the LEC technology is not that of a natural
monopoly, or that the LEC is not operating the natural monopoly technology
efficiently or pricing appropriately. Second, even if we believe that the LEC
technology were that of a natural monopoly, we would be forced to conclude
that natural monopoly technology was insufficient to guarantee that an
incumbent could achieve a monopoly in the market as a result of its
technology. Either way the natural monopoly argument for regulation of the
local exchange ceases to hold.
Indeed, there are competing multiple carriers in the local exchange.'
Cable systems are already in place and available for competition in telephone
service. Interexchange carriers such as AT&T, MCI, and Sprint provide, in
addition to transmission from one local access and transport area (LATA) to
another (interLATA service), some intraLATA service in competition with the
RBOCs. In January 1994, MCI announced that it planned to upgrade its
network in order to compete against the RBOCs in providing local access.'
In 1993, AT&T announced its intention to acquire McCaw, the largest cellular
46. It might be argued that this does not refute the view that natural monopoly is not a barrier
to entry if the incumbent RBOCs are handicapped by regulatory restrictions. The restrictions then provide
protection to unregulated competitors and effectively subsidize entry. However, if the natural monopoly
view were correct, one would expect the entry of at most one other carrier taking advantage of regulatory
restrictions and employing the natural monopoly technology. This is refuted by the fact that multiple
companies are entering the local exchange.
47. John J. Keller, MCI Proposes a $20 Billion Capital Project, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1994, at
A3.
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carrier in the United States, which could eventually enable AT&T to bypass
the RBOCs in reaching the end user."' Dozens of CAPs, such as Teleport
Communications and Metropolitan Fiber Systems, provide fiber-optic
transmission service and connection to interexchange carriers.49 Many
companies provide wireless transmission service, including cellular
telecommunications networks.5" PCS will emerge as a new and significant
form of radio communications upon completion of the Federal Communications
Commission's auctions for narrowband and broadband PCS licenses."1 The
FCC anticipates that "the advent of PCS will open the commercial mobile
radio services marketplace, which includes cellular service, to intense
competition. "52
The entry of competitors into the local loop has shown that there are no
technological properties inherent to the local exchange that are sufficient to
48. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 16 (1994).
49. CONNECTICUT RESEARCH, 1994 LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION VI-1 (1994).
According to a survey by the Yankee Group, only about half of all virtual private network customers
opt for access through their local telco rather than using direct dedicated links to the interexchange
carrier. Ellis Booker, Virtual NetworkEquals Savings, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 5, 1990, at 51. See also
Bob Wallace, John Hancock Completes Cutover from WATS to SDN, Change Expected to Save Firm
$1.2M Annually, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 27, 1990, at 2; Bob Wallace, Firm Installs SDN, Waits on
Tarffl2, NETWORK WORLD, Sept. 4,1989, at 1; John Dix, Communications Options; The World Beyond
AT&T, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 30, 1985-Jan. 6, 1986, at 33.
The U.S. cities and regions served by CAPs contain the headquarters of over sixty percent of the
companies that appear on the Communications Week list of the top 100 purchasers of telecommunications
products and services. Anita Marks, Electric Lightwave Readies Expansion Worth $120 Million, Bus.
J. PORTLAND, Mar. 1, 1993, § 1, at 1; Penni Crabtree, Bell Tolls for PacBell Monopoly as Teleport
Moves In, SAN DIEGO Bus. J., Feb. 8, 1993, § 1, at 1; Christine Hudgins-Bonafield, Big Spenders,
lse Spenders-Top 100 List Names Largest Communications Spenders, While Strategic Mission Awads
Honor Some oflndustry's Most Innovative Spenders, COMM. WK., May 18, 1992, at 44-45.
50. There are nineteen million cellular subscribers comprising twelve percent of all wireline and
wireless access lines. Cellular Phone Subscribers Top 19 Million Mark, supra note 43; FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS 57 (1992/1993) (140
million wireline access lines).
51. According to Business Week, "The wireless boom that began with cellular phone systems
has accelerated as new technologies emerge," including cellular, PCS, specialized mobile radio, and
satellite-based systems. Business Week reports a prediction of Arthur D. Little that the market in the
U.S. will triple from $14 billion to $45 billion by 2002 as the number of wireless callers increases from
forty million to ninety million. It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad Wireless World, Bus. WK., Nov. 29, 1993,
at 128, 132. The GTE Corporation expects "total wireless voice services-including both Cellular and
PCS-to reach some 30% of the population" by the year 2005, representing a market penetration of
approximately 70 percent of U.S. households. Prepared Remarks of Dr. C.J. Waylan, Executive Vice
President Marketing and Business Development, GTE Personal Communications Services, In the Matter
of Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Gen.
Dkt. No. 90-314 (F.C.C. Apr. 11, 1994) (en banc). See also Peter Cramon, Money Out of Thin Air:
The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction, J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY (forthcoming 1995).
52. In re Applications of Craig 0. McCaw & AT&T for the Consent to Transfer, File No. ENF-
93-44, 40 (F.C.C. Sept. 19, 1994) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (footnotes omitted). FCC states
that "The introduction of broadband PCS should benefit consumers by raising the overall level of
competition in many already competitive segments of the telecommunications industry and by providing
competition in other segments for the first time." In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the
Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, Fifth Report and Order 3 (F.C.C. June 29, 1994).
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guarantee a monopoly to the incumbent LECs. Such competitive entry implies
that the natural monopoly argument should not be used to justify forbidding
entry by the RBOCs into other lines of business.
II. The Barriers to Entry Argument
The second argument used to justify the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions
is that there are barriers to entry in the local exchange that will maintain the
monopoly position of the RBOCs. Judge Greene, for example, has stated that
"duplication of the ubiquitous local exchange networks would require an
enormous and prohibitive capital investment."53 This Section defines barriers
to entry and examines whether they are present in local exchange markets. The
Section demonstrates that the sunk cost argument for regulation of the local
loop no longer applies and that entrants have already sunk costs for multiple
networks.
A. The Definition of Barriers to Entry
Barriers to entry are costs imposed on entrants but not present for
incumbents. 4 There are two main types of barriers to entry: sunk costs and
goverment regulation.55 Sunk costs are said to be a barrier to entry if entrants
must make irreversible investments in capacity, expenses which incumbents
have already incurred. Government regulation that takes the form of rules
applying unequally to incumbents and entrants can create additional costs for
entrants, potentially restricting market entry entirely.56
If an incumbent, but not an entrant, has already incurred the sunk cost
of facilities, the incumbent need only price to recover operating expenses and
incremental capital expenditures, since the irreversible investment costs of
entry can be written off. A potential entrant, in contrast, must anticipate
earnings exceeding its operating costs, incremental investment and irreversible
costs of establishing its facilities, before it will attempt to enter the market.
The need to sink costs is not necessarily an insurmountable barrier to the
entry of new competitors. All competitive markets involve some degree of
irreversible investment, whether in capital equipment, marketing, or research
and development. Entrants commit capital resources in markets where they
53. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 538 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 894 F.2d
1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
54. This definition of entry barriers is due to GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 67 (1968). The definition is commonly applied. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Robert D.
Willig, Fired Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q. J. EcON. 405,
408 (1981).
55. For additional discussion of barriers to entry, see SPULBER, supra note 4, at 40-42.
56. Licenses ae referred to as "absolute barriers to entry" in STIGLER, supra note 54, at 123-5.
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expect to earn competitive returns on their investments. The sunk costs
involved in establishing a telecommunications system, given currently available
technologies, are not qualitatively different from irreversible investments in
any other competitive market. Furthermore, in competitive markets there is
often duplication of investment, and the entry of excess or insufficient capacity
can take place as a consequence of uncertainty regarding costs, technology,
or market demand. Therefore, even if sunk costs are present in
telecommunications, they need not in themselves confer monopoly rents on
incumbents.
In addition, entrants can reduce the risk associated with making investment
commitments in a variety of ways, including contracting with customers before
irreversible investments are made and entering into joint ventures or mergers
with incumbents. Moreover, a potential entrant need not be deterred from entry
if it has a sufficient cost advantage over the incumbent. The developments in
the industry since the MFJ amply demonstrate that many companies are willing
and able to make the irreversible investments required to enter the business
of local telecommunications.
B. Barriers to Entry and the Local Exchange
There is no question that the RBOCs have a predominant market share,
and that these companies are large in terms of various measures of size,
including number of customers and miles of transmission lines. These facts,
however, need not indicate that the RBOCs have market power in the local
exchange. An incumbent firm is subject to the competitive discipline of
potential entry when its market power is not substantial. As Judge Greene
stated regarding AT&T: "Although monopoly power may be inferred from a
firm's predominant market share, size alone is not synonymous with market
power, particularly where entry barriers are not substantial.""
While this Article notes above that both sunk costs and government
regulation are sources of barriers to entry, sunk costs are the barrier to entry
primarily associated with the local exchange. According to Greene:
Local exchange competition has failed to develop, not so much
because state and local regulators prohibit entry into the market by
would-be competitors of the Regional Companies, but because of the
economic and technological infeasibility of alternative local
distribution technologies.58
57. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'dsub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
58. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 537-538 (D.D.C. 1987), affd, 894
F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Based on an examination of the telecommunications industry, this Article
concludes that because of technological change, barriers to entry due to sunk
costs are not at present a significant deterrent to entry into the local exchange.
Moreover, the- question of whether sunk costs are a barrier to entry is
essentially moot because substantial competitive entry into the local
telecommunications market has already occurred.
In addition, an examination of federal and state regulation of the
telecommunications industry suggests that such regulation does not represent
barriers to entry into the local exchange. In many markets, the RBOCs in fact
face incumbent burdens, in which regulation imposes greater costs on
incumbents than on entrants, thereby encouraging, or even subsidizing some
forms of entry, and creating the potential for uneconomic bypass.59 Uneco-
nomic bypass occurs when competitive entry raises the total industry costs of
providing a given level of service. It can result from subsidies or differences
in regulation between incumbents and entrants.6°
C. The Sunk Cost Argument for Regulation of the Local Loop No Longer
Applies
The evolution of telecommunications technology invalidates the argument
that there are barriers to entry into local telecommunications markets stemming
from the high sunk costs of establishing a telecommunications network. The
notion that there are prohibitive capital requirements in duplicating the local
exchange network rests on several economic and technological misconceptions.
First, a new entrant need not duplicate the RBOCs' entire transmission
and switching systems to enter the market profitably. The entrant need only
enter portions of the market where the expected revenues exceed the expected
costs of providing new service. Thus, an entrant must sink the costs required
to serve only its specific customers. The size of the incumbent's sunk costs
is irrelevant to the entrant. By choosing to serve only part of the local
exchange market, the entrant's irreversible investment is substantially reduced.
Second, the entrant need not duplicate the technology of the incumbent
RBOCs' transmission and switching systems. The technology of
telecommunications transmission has changed substantially in a manner that
alters the types of investment required to establish a network. While transmis-
sion wires represent the primary irreversible investment incurred by the LECs,
many new technologies, such as cellular, mobile radio technology, and satellite
transmission, substantially reduce the wired portion of the transmission system.
59. The term "incumbent burdens" was introduced in Paul W. MacAvoy et al., Is Competitive
Entry Free?: Bypass and Partial Deregulation in Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 210
(1989).
60. Id.
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By serving areas using wireless transmission, particularly for the "last mile"
to the customer's location, the new technologies are not tied to specific
customers through irreversible investment in transmission. For example, a
transmission tower and receiver are not customer-specific since they can serve
any customers in a given geographic area. Moreover, radio transmission
facilities themselves do not necessarily represent sunk costs, since they can be
physically moved to serve other markets. These features of some of the new
transmission technologies eliminate the need for significant transaction-specific
or customer-specific investments.
Third, technological change has altered the design of telecommunications
systems. Telecommunications systems provide transmission services using a
combination of switches and transmission. The increased power and reduced
cost of computer chips have correspondingly increased the power and reduced
the cost of switches. To the extent that switches can be substituted for
transmission lines, the cost-minimizing input mix will involve a greater reliance
on switches and a correspondingly lesser reliance on lines. Also, as the power
of switches has increased, so has their productivity. Increased productivity of
switches allows a reduction in the number of switches required to produce a
given level of transmission capacity. For example, the private branch exchange
switching technology allows a reduction in the number of lines required to
provide a given level of capacity to a customer's premises.
A reduction in the number of lines required to provide a given level of
capacity implies that this potential source of sunk costs is reduced for a new
entrant into the local telecommunications market. Moreover, the switches
operated by a telecommunications company, unlike lines, are not tied to a
particular customer location. The switches may be shifted to other applications,
and thus do not represent sunk costs. Also, the switches owned and operated
by customers certainly do not represent sunk costs for a telecommunications
supplier. Thus, as technological change has significantly reduced sunk costs,
the argument that sunk costs create a barrier to entry into the local exchange
ceases to apply.
There is another important way in which technological change in
telecommunications has eliminated the argument that sunk costs are a barrier
to entry. Given the extent of technological change since the time that the
incumbent has installed its infrastructure for the local loop, the incumbent's
technology and the entrant's technology differs substantially. The incumbent
operates an old technology, such as a network that uses copper wires for
transmission, whereas the entrant operates a new technology, such as one using
more efficient radio or fiber-optic transmission.
The barrier to entry argument is then invalid with respect to local
telecommunications in two ways. First, the operating cost differences between
existing and new technologies can be substantial. The fact that the incumbent
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has sunk costs does not deter entry, because the entrant offering a more
efficient technology, such as radio or fiber-optic transmission, can expect to
compete successfully with the incumbent and recover sunk costs.
Second, the need to sink costs is not a barrier to entry if the entrant can
invest in a new technology with a performance advantage over obsolescent
telecommunications technology. The performance characteristics of incumbent
and entrant technologies differ substantially. New access technologies offer
various benefits that are not available through copper-wire access technology
in the local loop. These benefits include the mobility of radio services, the in-
creased bandwidth of fiber-optic services, and the television transmission
capabilities of coaxial cable. If the incremental revenues that can be obtained
from the provision of value-added services, such as mobility or data
transmission, will be sufficient to cover the costs of establishing and operating
a new system, then it is irrelevant to the prospective entrant that the RBOC
has an advantage via its existing copper wire and other investments in the local
loop.
The existing and planned competitive entry into local telecommunications
show that the new technologies offer cost and performance advantages over
existing technologies. It follows that these advantages are sufficient to eliminate
the barriers to entry that arise from the facilities of the incumbent RBOCs and
the need for new entrants to sink costs. Of course, the RBOCs can invest in
the new technologies as readily as can any entrant, absent any regulatory
hurdles. However, the incumbent and the entrants are then on an equal footing.
The need to sink costs in a new technology falls evenly on the incumbent and
entrant and thus cannot constitute a barrier to entry.
D. Entry Barriers Are Not an Issue Because Costs Have Already Been Sunk
for Multiple Networks
The argument that sunk costs constitute a substantial barrier to entry into
the local exchange is also rendered invalid by the substantial entry into local
telecommunications that has already occurred."' As this Article has already
noted, there has been significant investment in local telecommunications
capacity by long-distance companies, dozens of competitive access providers,
61. At least twenty-three states have certified one or more local competitors. Connecticut,
Washington, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan and New York have authorized switched
local telephone competition. Illinois permits competition for some switched services and several other
states are considering the issue. States Meander, supra note 41. Although most CAPs target business
areas, these networks can be extended to serve residential areas. CAP Visions Diverge in Face of Market,
Regulatory Changes, "IELCO COMPETITION REP., May 12, 1994, at 1. For example, MCI Metro has
announced that it "intend[s] to serve everybody." MCI Metro Asks for Authority to Offer Switched Local
Services in five States, TELCo COMPETITION REP., Oct. 13, 1994, at 2.
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cable companies, cellular companies, and other wireless transmission sup-
pliers.62 The entry of new telecommunications companies in the local loop
conclusively establishes that sunk costs do not create a barrier to entry in the
local exchange markets that would be sufficient to confer a monopoly on the
RBOCs.
In addition, the significant entry that has already occurred implies that new
entrants do not necessarily have a cost disadvantage relative to incumbent
RBOCs, for those new entrants have already made irreversible investments.
After their irreversible investments have been made, entrants become incum-
bents. From that point forward, the costs of entry cannot be used to distinguish
RBOCs from new communications providers. Moreover, there is considerable
evidence of the existence of excess capacity in the local exchange markets,
particularly in fiber-optic capacity, which suggests that the additional capacity
created by new carriers will result in intense price competition with the
RBOCs."3
E. Regulation of the RBOCs Creates Incumbent Burdens Rather Than Entry
Barriers
Another form of entry barrier is created when a regulator awards an
exclusive franchise to a LEC, thus precluding the entry of new carriers.
However, the view that such a grant of statutory monopoly over local
telecommunications is common today is incorrect. Although entry into the local
exchange was once tightly regulated, it is not any longer. Here again, the entry
of many new carriers into the local exchange markets suggests that such an
entry barrier is not effective. The majority of state regulatory authorities allow
competitive entry into their intraLATA toll markets," and CAPs are intercon-
necting with the local exchange network in many states, including Illinois, New
York, and Massachusetts.
62. AT&T is paying more than $11 billion for McCaw. MCI Metro is investing two billion dollars
in fiber rings and local switching infrastructure in major United States metropolitan markets. MCI Unveils
Long-Range Vision: NetworkMCI, Opens Nation's First Transcontinental Information Superhighway, PR
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 4, 1994, at 2. Sprint acquired Centel, with local exchange and cellular operations, for
$2.5 billion. Gambling on Thin Air, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1993, at 49. The cellular industry has made
a cumulative investment of $13.9 billion through December 1993. CELLULAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUS. ASS'N, THE WIRELESS SOURCEBOOK 9 (1994). Ten CAPs reporting cumulative investment to
the FCC had sunk $94 million by year-end 1993. JONATHAN M. KRAUsHAAR, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPD'ATE: END OF YEAR 1993 27 (1994). The
combined investment of the cable companies in developing their networks should also be included,
although reliable estimates of cumulative industry investment are not readily available.
63. For example, in 1992, the RBOCs reported that a substantial proportion of their fiber-optic
capacity was not yet activated. JONATHAN M. KRAUSHAAR, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, FIBER
DEPLOYMENT UPDATE: END OF YEAR 1992 18 (1993).
64. NATIONAL ASs'N OF REoULATORY UTIL. CoMM'Rs, THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN
INTRASTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 198-200 (1994).
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If anything, federal and state regulations create incumbent burdens,
imposing costs and restrictions on RBOCs that are not placed on the new en-
trants. An incumbent burden facilitates entry and bypass of the existing
telecommunications network even if such bypass would be uneconomic in the
absence of the regulations. It is therefore the opposite of a barrier to entry.
The RBOCs face a variety of regulatory restrictions, including common
carrier provisions, universal service requirements, and public filing of rates,
none of which are generally imposed on new entrants. Other restrictions on
RBOCs create lower limits on certain tariffs, which limit the their ability to
compete with entrants and provide a tariff umbrella for competitors. The
regulated rate structure of the RBOCs, with high rates charged to business
customers, has created opportunities for selective bypass of the local network.
One incumbent burden created by federal regulation is the differential treatment
of access charges that AT&T pays to traditional LECs versus those it pays to
new access providers. AT&T is required to pass along to its customers savings
in access charges paid to traditional LECs, but it need not pass along the
savings on access charges paid to new access providers.65 Therefore, the
argument that regulations create entry barriers that confer a statutory monopoly
on the RBOCs belies the current state of industry regulation.
The economic inefficiency created by incumbent burdens suggests that the
entry of competitors should be accompanied by a lifting of uneven restrictions
placed on the RBOCs. By removing these restrictions, regulators will level the
playing field, allowing the RBOCs to respond to competitive challenges
through pricing, investment and innovation. If the restrictions were lifted, any
futher entry would reflect a truly competitive market, instead of a market made
artificially competitive by regulation.
Indeed, not only do regulatory restrictions create incumbent burdens for
the RBOCs, the line-of-business restrictions of the MFJ similarly restrain the
RBOCs. The RBOCs are prevented from entering markets that could generate
revenues, while competitors in the local exchange are not similarly denied
access to these other markets. Since the line-of-business restrictions deny the
RBOCs the opportunity to earn revenues that their competitors may earn, they
are placed at a disadvantage and denied returns to their technological expertise
and market knowledge. This constraint handicaps the RBOCs against actual
and potential competitors in the local exchange. In the absence of the line-of-
business restrictions, the RBOCs would be able to compete in the same
markets as their competitors. The incumbent burdens created by the line-of-
business restrictions further demonstrate that regulation is not a barrier to entry
65. Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873, 3005-06 259-
61, 3026-30 315-21 (1989) (AT&T Price Cap Order).
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to the local exchange, but actually creates a competitive disadvantage for the
RBOCs.
III. The Leverage Argument
The third argument used to justify the line-of-business restrictions on the
RBOCs is that, if permitted entry into the manufacturing and interLATA
markets, the RBOCs could leverage their monopoly position in the local
exchange to obtain an unfair competitive advantage over potential competitors
in these markets. The leverage argument is based on the antitrust law concept
of vertical restraints.66 This Section defines leverage and examines the
application of the leverage argument to the local exchange carriers. As this
Article will demonstrate below, the leverage argument is generally flawed in
any market. Since a monopolist can always extract monopoly rents in the
market it controls, it cannot increase its rents by expansion into a second
market. Furthermore, competition in the local exchange market eliminates the
possibility of exercising such leverage.
A. The Definition of Leverage
Leverage is defined in the antitrust context as the use of monopoly power
in one market to extract additional monopoly rents and to secure competitive
advantages in a second market.67 Leverage is designed to exclude competitors
from all or part of the second market. The exclusion of competitors from the
second market is referred to as foreclosure. Leverage may be exercised in a
variety of ways. These include: (1) tying, (2) restricting access to essential
facilities, and (3) refusing to deal. The tying and essential facilities examples
have often been applied in telecommunications antitrust cases.6"
66. Antitrust law has played a crucial role in the organization of the telecommunications industry.
"The U.S. telephone industry has been shaped more by antitrust law than by any aspect of federal or
state regulation." KELLOGG Er AL., supra note 3, at 137. One of the major concerns of antitrust law
in telecommunications has been in the area of vertical restraints, particularly exclusionary practices.
Vertical restraints denote a company's actions that restrict its buyer or seller relationships with other
companies. Exclusionary practices is a general pejorative label covering a host of competitive and
contractual activities that are alleged to create barriers to competition and increase a company's market
power. Posner defines an exclusionary practice as occurring when a firm "trades a part of its monopoly
profits, at least temporarily, for a large market share, by making it unprofitable for other sellers to
compete with it." RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTTRuST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 28 (1976).
67. The Second Circuit, in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F. 2d 263, 276 (2nd
Cir. 1979), stated that "the use of monopoly power attained in one market to gain a competitive
advantage in another is a violation of § 2 [of the Sherman Act], even if there has not been an attempt
to monopolize the second market." This monopoly leverage argument has been rejected in Air Passenger
Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1472 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
68. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 3, at 142.
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Tying refers to a situation in which the seller of a good requires the buyer
to purchase a second good, thus selling the two as a product bundle.69 For
example, a tying contract offered by an RBOC would require the buyer of its
local service to purchase its long-distance service as well. In such a situation,
the RBOC would be leveraging its market power in the local service, or tying
product's market, over to its long-distance service, or tied product's market.
Courts are generally concerned with the restriction of competition in the tied
product's market. The reasoning behind the law and court decisions on tying
has been subject to significant criticism.7" As Judge Richard A. Posner has
observed, "[o]ne striking deficiency of the traditional, 'leverage' theory of tie-
ins, as the courts have applied it, is the failure to require any proof that a
monopoly of the tied product is even a remotely plausible consequence of the
tie-in."71 In short, the problem with the tying theory of leverage is that the
monopolist has little incentive to tie its products in bundles, since it generally
can obtain no additional profits from the tie-in sale, and rarely obtains market
power in the market for the tied good.72
The firm may obtain benefits from tie-ins if the tied good aids the firm
in metering the usage of the tying good for pricing purposes. However, as
Posner observes, this does not imply that there is an incentive to exclude
competition. In the telecommunications context, the LEC certainly is capable
of monitoring usage of its local service without the sale of additional long-
distance services or equipment.
An essential facility is a productive input that cannot be duplicated feasibly
or economically by others.73 The concept has been applied rather broadly in
antitrust law and has elements of both natural monopoly and barriers to entry.
As in the case of natural monopoly technology, the essential facility should not
be duplicated, since the market is served at minimum cost with one facility.
An essential facility is similar to a barrier to entry in that a competitor cannot
feasibly or economically duplicate a facility in a market. Thus, the argument
goes, an existing facility will not be duplicated because an entrant would incur
irreversible investment costs. Alternatively, it is suggested that the costs of
duplicating the facility are higher for an entrant than an incumbent.
69. In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), the Supreme Court
held that tying violates the Sherman Act if !he seller has both a monopoly in the tying product and if
competitors are foreclosed in the tied product, while the Clayton Act applies if either of these conditions
holds.
70. Robert Bork calls this "transfer of market power" theory behind the antitrust law against
tying, and the Supreme Court's enforcement of it, "fallacious." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 366 (1978). See also Ward S. Bowman, 7ying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957). George Stigler criticizes the application of the law on tying in GEORGE J. STIOLER,
United States v. Loew's, Inc.. A Note on Block Booking, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 152.
71. POSNER, supra note 66, at 172.
72. Id. at 173.
73. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
The essential facility doctrine goes beyond the natural monopoly and
barriers to entry ideas since it incorporates vertical elements. The owner of
the essential facility not only has monopoly power in one market but is
presumed to deny equitable access to competing firms in another market. In
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, the Court found a railroad
switching junction to be an essential facility.74 In Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, the Court found that the electric power transmission lines of the
utility were an essential facility.7' The standard antitrust remedy for the
existence of an essential facility is to mandate equal access to that facility,76
which is what the MFJ mandated for long-distance carriers.
B. Leverage and the Local Exchange
In 1982, Judge Greene stated with regard to interLATA services: "The
complexity of the telecommunications network would make it possible for [the
RBOCs] to establish and maintain an access plan that would provide to their
own interexchange service more favorable treatment than that granted to other
carriers."' Similarly, with respect to the manufacture of telecommunications
equipment, Judge Greene stated that "non-affiliated manufacturers would be
disadvantaged in the sale of such equipment and the development of a
competitive market would be frustrated."78
The leverage argument has thus been applied to the RBOCs in two ways.
First, it has been argued that the RBOC could use its monopoly to sell its own
long-distance services or telecommunications equipment to itself or to its
existing customers. Second, the argument asserts, the RBOC could use its
control over its essential facilities, or local bottleneck, to extract monopoly
rents by rationing its customers' access to equipment or long distance services.
Judge Greene stated that "the local facilities controlled by Bell are 'essential
facilities'" for long-distance carriers.79 As this Article will explain below,
these two arguments are inconsistent with technological changes and industry
developments that have occurred since the MFJ.
74. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
75. 410 U.S. at 366.
76. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 3, at 140.
77. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), a d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
78. Id. at 190. With regard to information services, Judge Greene stated: "The Operating
Companies would.., have the same incentives and the same ability to discriminate against competing
information service providers that they would have with respect to competing interexchange carriers."
Id. at 189.
79. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp 1336, 1346 (D.D.C. '1981).
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C. The Erosion of the Local Exchange Monopoly Eliminates the Possibility
Of Leverage and Self-Dealing
The argument that an RBOC will use its monopoly in the local exchange
to sell long-distance services and telecommunications equipment to its own
customers in a manner that denies access to other firms is inconsistent with
current industry conditions. As this Article has already explained, the view that
an RBOC has a monopoly over the local exchange by virtue of natural
monopoly technology is no longer valid. Moreover, the assertion that the LEC
has a monopoly resulting from barriers to entry due to sunk costs or regulation
is also based on improper analysis. In addition, the presence of competition
and the potential for substantial additional entry into the local exchange invali-
date the notion of the existence of a monopoly in the local loop.
As Judge Greene noted with regard to concerns over AT&T's market
share in the market for interexchange services, low entry barriers and the
"trend of increasing competition" imply a lack of market power."0 The same
argument can now be applied to the RBOCs, for the technology of the local
exchange exhibits substantially reduced entry barriers, and there is a clear
trend toward increased competition. The absence of either monopoly or the
potential for monopoly in the local exchange therefore implies that the "pivot"
required to support leverage does not exist. The monopoly-leverage argument
consequently fails.
In the case of interLATA services, customers have a choice of
interexchange carriers, including AT&T, MCI, and Sprint. Moreover,
customers have alternative means of accessing interexchange carriers through
wireless or fiber-optic networks. Therefore, many customers can already
access long-distance providers without going through the local exchange. These
alternatives will continue to expand as the interexchange carriers themselves
vertically integrate into the provision of local access, including AT&T through
its acquisition of McCaw's cellular network and MCI through its own
construction of metropolitan fiber rings. Furthermore, under equal-access
regulations, the interLATA services of the RBOCs would compete on an equal
footing with interexchange carriers that currently reach customers through the
local exchange. Thus, the line-of-business restriction on the provision of
interLATA services by RBOCs ignores the alternative forms of access that
have become available to consumers since the MFJ took effect.
We have seen that an RBOC could not prevent its customers from
accessing other long-distance carriers if it were allowed to enter the interLATA
market. As this Article will show below, the argument that an RBOC could
80. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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leverage its monopoly position to control its customers' access to telecom-
munications equipment is also inconsistent with current industry conditions.
For purposes here, equipment can be classified into customer premises
equipment and telephone company switching and transmission equipment. With
respect to either broad category, there is little or no basis for the monopoly-
leverage argument. Although AT&T exercised control over customer premises
equipment and telephone company purchases of switching and transmission
equipment prior to the breakup, since the MFJ, this type of control has no
longer been retained by anyone.
For equipment purchased by customers for use on their own premises,
such as handsets, answering machines, fax machines, computers, inside wiring,
and PBX, there is absolutely no basis for concluding that an RBOC can
exercise 'any control at all on the choices of supplier. Customers buy such
equipment in the marketplace. An RBOC has no more control over these
purchases than does a broadcast television network over the brand of television
set purchased by its viewers.
For telephone company purchases of switching and transmission
equipment, an RBOC could choose to purchase equipment that it manufactured
if the line-of-business restrictions were removed. For two reasons, this is not
a cause for concern. First, since many of its customers have the choice of
alternative telecommunications providers, the RBOCs' ability to pass along
the costs of equipment purchases is severely limited. This, in turn, significantly
reduces or eliminates any potential returns to the RBOC's payment of high
prices to itself for equipment. Second, since the RBOCs are subject to price-
cap or similar incentive regulations at both the federal and state level and face
competition for portions of their markets, they would not have an incentive
to purchase any particular type of equipment from themselves unless they were
the lowest-cost provider. Moreover, the tremendous diversity of switching and
transmission equipment, particularly equipment developed since the time of
the MFJ, suggests that any one RBOC would manufacture only a subset of this
equipment. These factors suggest that self-dealing in equipment should not be
a concern.
D. The RBOCs' Networks are No Longer Essential Facilities
The essential facility argument outlined above is used to justify the line-of-
business restrictions on the RBOCs by implying that they will use their control
of the local exchange to deny their customers access to other long-distance
services, to require customers to purchase the RBOCs' own equipment, or to
require customers to purchase the RBOCs' own information services." The
81. In 1987, Judge Greene identified the local switches and circuits as an "essential facility" and
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argument that the LECs will be able to use their control over the local
exchange is inconsistent with the regulatory and industry developments in the
local exchange that this Article has already discussed. These developments
imply that the local loop is no longer an essential facility, just as they imply
that the RBOCs no longer qualify as natural monopolists or benefit from
barriers to entry. The essential facilities argument for the line-of-business
restrictions is thus no longer valid for three reasons.
First, the local loop is not an essential facility because there exist many
alternatives to the existing local exchange network provided by the regulated
local exchange carriers. The multiple technologies currently available for tele-
communications transmission, including coaxial cable, fiber optics, and
wireless technologies such as cellular and microwave, are sufficient to establish
the feasibility of constructing alternative transmission facilities to supplement,
compete with, or even replace portions of the local exchange network provided
by the RBOCs. The essential facilities argument implies that the RBOCs
metaphorically own and control a bridge that crosses a river at the only
feasible crossing point within some geographic area. To extend this analogy,
the availability of multiple transmission technologies is sufficient to establish
that there are many other ways to cross the river.
Second, the essential facilities argument is no longer valid because entry
into the local loop has already occurred. The economic viability of competitors
that are supplying transmission services using coaxial cable, fiber optics, and
wireless systems establishes that alternative facilities can be constructed
economically. Thus, it is not only technically feasible to construct alternative
facilities, but also economically feasible. For example, CAPs already offer
access to long-distance carriers on facilities that bypass the local loop.
Although the CAPs' fiber-optic systems are small in size compared to those
of the RBOCs, their entry has demonstrated the economic feasibility of
bypassing portions of the local loop. Similarly, the rapid growth of the cellular
industry demonstrates the economic feasibility of other means of access. These
developments have all occurred since the MFJ took effect in 1984. It would
be myopic to point to the absolute size of an RBOC's local-loop plant as
evidence that it is an essential facility.
Even though the local loop is no longer an essential facility, regulations
still exist guaranteeing access to the local exchange for long-distance carriers.
The existence of these provisions also serves to invalidate the essential facilities
argument with respect to interLATA services: even if the local exchange were
to involve facilities that could not be duplicated, the equal-access provisions
concluded that "the Regional Companies have retained control of the local bottlenecks." United States
v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 540 (D.D.C. 1987), af'd, 894 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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already eliminate any advantage that an RBOC could otherwise gain by
offering long-distance services.
In short, the essential facilities argument fails to apply because the local
exchange is no longer an essential facility for access to the telecommunications
network. An RBOC cannot leverage an essential facility that it does not
possess.
IV. The Cross-Subsidization Argument
The fourth argument in favor of the line-of-business restrictions puts
forward the notion that an RBOC will use profits from the local exchange to
engage in cross-subsidization of other lines of business. The argument suggests
that the RBOCs would gain an unfair competitive advantage. This Section
defines cross-subsidization and considers the application of the cross-
subsidization argument to the local exchange carriers. It shows that the RBOCs
do not have an incentive to cross-subsidize long-distance service or equipment
manufacturing and that growing competition reduces the profits from the local
exchange that could be used for cross-subsidies.
A. The Definition of Cross-Subsidization
Cross-subsidization occurs when a company supplying more than one
product or service uses the revenues from product A to recover a portion of
the additional costs of producing product B. This practice creates economic
inefficiencies since the customers of product A would be better off if the
products were produced and priced separately.12 Moreover, the customers
of product B are given incorrect price signals about the incremental costs of
producing product B.
There are formal tests for cross-subsidization. A regulated firm's rate
structure can be said to be free of cross-subsidies if and only if the prices
satisfy the stand-alone cost test. 3 The stand-alone cost test requires that the
revenues generated from either of two services not exceed the stand-alone cost
of providing that service. If the revenues from one service exceed its
stand-alone cost, then that service is providing a cross-subsidy to the other ser-
vice." Clearly, the customers of the service that is providing the cross-
82. Such separation, however, would forego economies from joint production.
83. The stand-alone cost test is a widely applied criterion. See BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note
48, at 81; BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 18, at 352-353.
84. The definition of the stand-alone cost test is given in terms of two services. In the case of
more than two services, the test requires that no group of services subsidizes any other group of services.
The regulated rate structure refers to a break-even rate structure.
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subsidy would be better off if that service could be obtained independently of
the other service.
A firm's rate structure also is free of cross-subsidies if and only if the
prices satisfy the incremental cost test, which is equivalent to the stand-alone
cost test for a regulated rate structure. 5 Applying the incremental cost test,
revenues generated by each service cover the incremental cost of providing
that service. 6 The rationale for the incremental cost test is the requirement
that each service must generate revenues that at least cover the additional cost
of producing that service. If not, the other service is providing a cross-subsidy,
and the customers of the other service would be better off receiving their
service independently, at its stand-alone cost.
If the firm's rates are not necessarily break-even rates but instead generate
revenues that are greater than or equal to costs, then the incremental cost test
should be applied to determine cross-subsidization, regardless of whether
regulation exists. If the firm operates in both regulated and unregulated
markets, the revenues in the unregulated market should cover the firm's
incremental costs of serving the unregulated market, in order to be free of
cross-subsidies. This guarantees that serving the unregulated market increases,
or at least does not reduce, the firm's profit.
B. Cross-Subsidization and the Local Exchange
In 1982, Judge Greene ruled that the RBOCs would employ cross-
subsidization to foreclose competition in interexchange services, information
services, and the manufacture of equipment. The RBOCs, he wrote, would be
able "to subsidize their interexchange prices with profits earned from their
monopoly services" and "to subsidize the prices of their [information] services
with revenues from the local exchange monopoly." They "would have an
incentive to subsidize the prices of their equipment with the revenues from
their monopoly services."7
The RBOCs have lost any opportunity to cross-subsidize. The profits from
the local exchange service that could be used to provide cross-subsidies to
interLATA services or equipment manufacturing are significantly reduced by
existing and potential competition in the local loop. Judge Greene observed
85. The incremental cost test is a widely applied criterion that has been used for over a century.
For further discussion and a formal definition, see BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 48, at 57, 81-83;
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: APPLICATIONS AND THEORY 113-20 (1986).
86. The incremental cost test is defined here for only two services. In the case of more than two
services, the revenues generated by each group of services must cover the incremental cost of providing
that group of services.
87. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 188-190 (D.D.C. 1982), af'd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). As Judge Greene observed, it must be
shown that the RBOCs have both "the incentive and opportunity to act anticompetitively." Id. at 187.
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that "AT&T's opportunity for cross-subsidization will become increasingly
curtailed as interexchange competition increases."" This same observation
now applies to the situation of the RBOCs in the local exchange: their
opportunity for cross-subsidization has been curtailed by competition in the
local loop. Moreover, this Article explains below that the belief that the
RBOCs have the incentive to predatorily cross-subsidize is based on specious
economic reasoning.
C. The RBOCs Do Not Have an Incentive to Subsidize Activities Outside the
Local Exchange
The cross-subsidy argument relies on the notion that the RBOC has an
incentive to subsidize its entry into other lines of business, particularly those
from which it is now barred by the MFJ's restrictions. In other words, for the
cross-subsidy argument to apply, the RBOC would have to earn incremental
revenues that are less than the incremental cost of providing other services,
thus incurring an economic loss on these additional lines of business. Such an
action would be inconsistent with profit maximization and would not be
undertaken by an RBOC because it would be inconsistent with the interests of
its shareholders. This is not to say that other lines of business would not incur
the normal initial losses that occur as new businesses are established. It is
normal for investors to accept losses in the initial phases of establishing a new
line of business. Moreover, a line of business may incur losses as a conse-
quence of the normal market risks faced by any business. It is, however,
inconsistent with business objectives and economic analysis to expect that an
RBOC would enter a market with the intention of incurring a loss, even if that
loss were subsidized from earnings in another part of its business. The interests
of the RBOC's owners would be to invest those earnings in a venture expected
to be profitable. Therefore, the notion that an RBOC would obtain a
competitive advantage through cross-subsidies is incorrect and at odds with the
profit-making objectives of shareholder-owned companies. A business will not
cross-subsidize a new business venture that it expects to be unprofitable.
Another assumption of the cross-subsidy argument is that an RBOC would
use cross-subsidies to temporarily obtain a competitive advantage over its rivals
in other lines of business, with the objective of eliminating competitors. This
view implies that the RBOC would engage in behavior resembling predatory
pricing, which is said to occur when firms incur a loss with the intention of
eliminating rivals and later raising prices to recoup earnings after the rivals
have exited the market.8 9 This argument has been discredited, as both econo-
88. Id. at 173.
89. See, e.g., BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 48, at 63; SPULER, supra note 4, at 475-76.
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mists and the Supreme Court generally agree that predatory pricing is unlikely
to succeed because there is little guarantee of successful recoupment, because
rivals can also incur losses in anticipation of future profits, and because new
entrants will appear if prices are raised after the existing competitors have
exited the industry.9" Moreover, it is difficult in practice to distinguish low
competitive prices from predatory prices and to distinguish low earnings from
predatory losses."
The scenario of cross-subsidization and predatory pricing grows
increasingly implausible when one considers that the interLATA and equipment
markets the RBOC would enter have multiple incumbent suppliers with
substantial capacity. In the interLATA market particularly, any attempt by an
RBOC at predatory pricing would be futile because AT&T, MCI, and Sprint
all have substantial capacity. Furthermore, the durability and expanding
transmission capacity of fiber-optic cable would make it impossible for an
RBOC to restrict industry output and raise prices above incremental costs
during the recoupment phase of the predation scenario. Even in the unlikely
event that an RBOC could drive one of the three large interexchange carriers
into bankruptcy, the fiber-optic transmission capacity of that carrier would
remain intact, ready for another firm to buy the capacity at a distress sale and
immediately undercut the RBOC's noncompetitive prices. In short, an RBOC
engaging in predatory pricing in the interLATA market could not expect to
recoup its investment in sales made below incremental cost.
Even if one were to accept the predatory pricing argument, the connection
made to the possibility of cross-subsidization is fundamentally flawed. If indeed
an RBOC believed that it could enter a line of business profitably by initially
incurring losses and then eliminating rivals and recouping profits, it could
certainly do so by raising the requisite funds from investors. Through the
normal functioning of the capital markets, investors will fund a business that
is anticipated to be profitable, and cross-subsidies from one line of business
to another are not needed. The view that an RBOC would cross-subsidize what
would otherwise be a profitable business venture is therefore incorrect, because
it is ignores the willingness of investors to fund the venture and thereby share
in its returns.
90. Brooke Group Id. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
91. See BORK, supra note 70, at 144-155. For a survey of industrial organization models of
predation, see Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust, in I
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989)
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D. Competition in the Local Exchange Has Reduced the Profits With Which
the RBOC Could Cross-Subsidize Other Businesses
This Article has already stated that there is no economic incentive for an
RBOC to cross-subsidize entry into other lines of business, whether or not the
other businesses are expected to be profitable. Even if one were to believe that
such incentives existed, any concerns should be allayed by the growing
competition in the local loop. The significant level of competition in the local
loop reduces or eliminates the RBOC's economic profits that could be diverted
to other activities. This does not mean that the RBOCs are not currently
profitable. The accounting profits earned by the RBOCs may include a return
to their shareholders for the cost of capital. Rather, the RBOCs' economic
profits, which represent earnings above the cost of capital and other costs, are
controlled by the actions of actual and potential competitors. Furthermore, the
RBOCs face regulatory controls on prices or rates of return that further limit
their profits.
The presence of competition in local telecommunications markets,
moreover, will eventually eliminate any cross-subsidies that governmental
authorities have built into the existing regulated rate structure, such as the
subsidization of residential customers by business customers.9" If competitors
are as efficient as the RBOCs, then the RBOC cannot set the price for any
service at a level above the stand-alone costs of providing that service. If an
RBOC attempted to do so, a competitor could profitably enter that market and
provide the service on a stand-alone basis or in conjunction with other services.
If the competitor is more efficient than the RBOC, which is certainly possible
given the rapid pace of technological advances in telecommunications, the
RBOC cannot price its services at or above the efficient stand-alone costs.
E. The RBOCs Are Unlikely to Use Other Lines of Business to Shelter Income
Another variant of the cross-subsidy argument asserts that if the line-of-
business restrictions were lifted, an RBOC would use cross-subsidies to shelter
income from the regulated local loop by transferring it to its unregulated
equipment business, by setting above-market transfer prices for its self-
manufactured equipment. In states in which the RBOC is regulated using price-
caps or other incentive-based regulations, there is no incentive for such income
transfers to take place, as the RBOC's earnings are not controlled. In states
that still use rate-of-return regulation, various controls can prevent such income
92. On the elimination of cross-subsidies by competition in contestable markets, see BAtuMOL
ET AL., supra note 18, at 202.
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transfers. States that have not yet done so could adopt incentive-based
regulations. In addition, the states could apply equal access and competitive
bidding regulations, for example mandating that the RBOC obtain competitive
bids for equipment, thereby forcing it to bid against other equipment suppliers.
Due to the minimum efficient scale of manufacturing such sophisticated
telecommunications equipment as central office switches, it is unlikely that an
RBOC would find it profitable to produce only enough equipment to satisfy
its own needs. The RBOC's need to sell equipment to unaffiliated third parties
would therefore provide regulators an objective measure of the competitive
price for such equipment. In states with rate-of-return regulation, regulators
could readily observe whether the RBOC's internal transfer price for the same
equipment exceeded the market price. Regulators could also observe the
competing prices of other manufacturers as further evidence of the market
value of such equipment.
Finally, an RBOC cannot use income transfers to shelter income, because
such transfers would raise the costs of providing local exchange services above
competitive levels. The RBOC would then lose customers to existing and
potential competitors in the local loop. Active competition in the local loop
requires an RBOC to control its costs, which would be inconsistent with above-
market transfer prices for equipment and other services.
V. Eliminating the MFJ's Line-of-Business Restrictions Would Enhance
Economic Efficiency and Serve the Public Interest
Entry of the RBOCs into the provision of interLATA services and the
manufacture of telecommunications equipment would enhance competition in
those markets. The line-of-business restrictions are regulatory barriers to entry
that protect existing firms in the interLATA and equipment markets. Thus, for
the RBOCs the line-of-business restrictions are incumbent burdens that not only
restrict the competitiveness of the RBOCs in the local loop, but also give an
advantage to new entrants in that market who can exploit a broader range of
technologies in their service offerings and design of local networks. Allowing
the RBOCs to enter the interLATA and equipment markets would enhance
efficiency and stimulate innovation.
A. RBOC Provision of InterLATA Services
Allowing the RBOCs to enter the interLATA market would enhance
economic efficiency in at least four ways. First, there are likely to be
efficiency gains from the joint provision of access and interexchange services
that arise from the use of common inputs, such as switching facilities. AT&T's
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multi-billion-dollar acquisition of McCaw Cellular, as well as MCI's intention
to integrate into the local telecommunications market, imply that the companies
expect such efficiency gains to be substantial. These kinds of gains from
vertical integration are called "economies of sequence."" The RBOCs' entry
into the interLATA market would allow them to exploit any potential
economies of sequence between either local exchange and interLATA services
or between intraLATA and interLATA services. To deny the RBOCs entry
into the interLATA market would be to deny consumers the savings from the
cost efficiencies that such a combination would entail.
Second, to the extent that joint production yields economies of sequence,
effective competition against vertically integrated firms in interexchange servic-
es, primarily AT&T-McCaw and MCI, may require a rival to be similarly
vertically integrated. If the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions were eliminated,
an RBOC could not only pursue alliances and resale arrangements with other
carriers in the interLATA market, but could also extend its existing network
for intraLATA toll services to provide interLATA service within its region.
The result of such an extension would be enhanced competition in inter-
exchange services.
Third, the RBOCs bring considerable technical and business expertise to
the provision of interexchange services, which should serve to enhance
efficiency in the interLATA segment of the market. The RBOCs possess
technical and management experience in operating large telecommunications
networks. In particular, with more than twice the fiber miles of the
interexchange carriers, the RBOCs have technological expertise in fiber-optic
transmission, which is the backbone of the interexchange system."
Fourth, if the RBOCs were allowed to offer interLATA services, those
that chose to do so would be able to apply their technological experience to
research' and development. The RBOCs bring experience in switching,
providing access to long-distance services, and operating telecommunications
networks. Each of these skills can be applied to innovation in interexchange
services. Since access, switching, and transmission technologies continue to
evolve, multiple research approaches are desirable. Continuing to forbid the
RBOCs from providing interLATA services would therefore deny consumers
some of the dynamic efficiencies that result from rivalry in technological
innovation.
Continuing to bar the RBOCs' entry into interLATA services would
impede the achievement of cost efficiencies, reduce the dynamic efficiencies
from innovation, and deprive consumers of the benefits of increased competi
93. SPULBER, supra note 4, at 118-20.
94. In 1992, the RBOCs had 4,881,327 fiber miles, as compared with 2,412,100 fiber miles for
all of the interexchange carriers. KRAUSHAAR, supra note 63, at 6, 15.
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tion. Clearly, it is in the public interest to eliminate this line-of-business
restriction. The interexchange market is substantial. Total toll service revenues
of the long-distance carriers exceeded fifty-five billion dollars in 1991.9' The
market's size alone is sufficient to emphasize the public interest in opening the
market to formidable competitors possessing highly specialized technological
expertise. Increased domestic competition will create efficient and innovative
companies. This can be expected to enhance the competitive position of
American companies in the large international telecommunications market.
Long-distance telecommunications services are also closely related to the
development of technology for the access, transmission, and switching facilities
required for the so-called information superhighway. These interconnecting
telecommunications networks are expected to improve the productivity and
competitiveness of American industry and provide a variety of consumer
benefits.96 Continuing to bar the RBOCs from entering the interLATA
market, however, could reduce the industry's speed and effectiveness in creat-.
ing these superhighways.
B. RBOC Manufacture of Telecommunications Equipment
Eliminating the line-of-business restriction for equipment manufacturing
would also enhance economic efficiency. Entry into equipment manufacturing
would allow the RBOCs to exploit their knowledge of the characteristics of
the local exchange and to produce equipment that addresses needs that the
RBOCs are uniquely able to discern. The RBOCs bring long experience from
building and operating the local exchange that would be useful in equipment
manufacturing, particularly in the areas of central-office switching and in
transmission equipment. Given their experience in fiber-optic transmission, the'
RBOCs could also contribute to the market for fiber-optic equipment.
As with interLATA services, entry into equipment manufacturing by the
RBOCs would enhance dynamic efficiency. The RBOCs that entered the equip-,
ment manufacturing industry would be able to apply their technological
experience to research and development. As this Article has already empha-
sized in the context of the interLATA restrictions, because rapid technological
change continues to occur in the telecommunications industry, rivalry among
95. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS
6 (1991-92 ed.).
96. See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 20/20
VISION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1994), for discussions
of the National Information Infrastructure and the "Information Superhighway."
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firms in their research and development efforts is desirable. This is equally
true regarding telecommunications equipment.
Because the RBOCs' entry into equipment manufacturing could be
expected to yield dynamic efficiencies from innovation, as well as benefits
from increased competition, it is in the public interest to eliminate this line-of-
business, restriction. The increased sales of American producers in the
international market for telecommunications equipment could improve the
United States' balance of trade. In addition, by their entry into equipment
manufacturing, the RBOCs could contribute to the development of switching
and transmission technology crucial for building information superhighways.
It is therefore clear that eliminating the MFJ's line-of-business restriction on
equipment manufacturing would advance the public interest.
Conclusion
There is no economic basis for continuing to forbid the RBOCs from
providing interLATA services and manufacturing telecommunications
equipment. The main arguments in support of the MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions no longer apply to local exchange telecommunications. First, as
a consequence of technological change and the transformation of the telecom-
munications industry that has been occurring since the MFJ, an RBOC's
technology in the local exchange no longer exhibits the natural monopoly
property. Second, as a result of technological change and industry transfor-
mation since the MFJ, the RBOCs no longer benefit from any significant entry
barriers. Third, an RBOC could not unfairly leverage its market position in
the local exchange into other markets. Fourth, an RBOC could not employ
cross-subsidies from local service to achieve competitive advantages when
entering other lines of business. In short, the arguments for continuing the line-
of-business restrictions are no longer consistent with industry conditions and
technology.
At the same time, the line-of-business restrictions reduce competition and
deter innovation. As entrants in the interLATA and equipment markets, the
RBOCs would likely be able to exploit economies of scope and sequence. The
result would be an improvement in consumer welfare through lower costs and
more vigorous competition in these markets. In a dynamic sense, such entry
by the RBOCs would further benefit consumers by enabling the RBOCs to
apply their specialized knowledge to the research and development of a broader
spectrum of telecommunications products and services.
It is open to question whether the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions
benefited consumers a decade ago. Today, they surely do not. The restrictions
sacrifice competition, efficiency, and innovation while attempting to prevent
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conduct that is already prohibited by economic forces. The line-of-business
restrictions should be eliminated.

